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Abstract
This work introduces a model in which agents of a network act upon one another according
to three different kinds of moral decisions. These decisions are based on an increasing level of
sophistication in the empathy capacity of the agent, a hierarchy which we name Piaget’s Ladder.
The decision strategy of the agents is non-rational, in the sense that it does not minimize model’s
Hamiltonian, and the model presents quenched disorder given by the distribution of its defining
parameters. We obtain an analytical solution for this model in the thermodynamic limit and
also a leading order correction for finite sized systems. Using these results, we show that typical
realizations develop a rich phase structure with discontinuous non-thermal transitions.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Human societies are inherently complex. So much that recent research indicates that
even highly specialized qualitative knowledge from social sciences does not improve predic-
tion performance on average [1]. On the other hand, statistical physics models have been
successful in reproducing and predicting observed emergent behavior in real social datasets
[2–5], giving birth to a whole new branch of physics, still in its infancy, which has been
named Sociophysics [6].
Social scientists and psychologists often see these results with suspicion, arguing that each
human individual is different. It is however clear that human behavior presents identifiable
patterns without which their very disciplines would not exist. The difficulty comes from
the numerous sources of disorder which can affect individual behavior and their decisions
concerning social interactions [7, 8] as, for instance, the influence of mass media [9] or the
availability of natural resources [10]. The contribution of statistical physics has been in
understanding how emergent behaviors depend on the disorder and which are the relevant
parameters driving transitions between the different phases [11].
One of the most studied problems in sociology concerns the emergence of moral behavior
and its consequences to the general well-being and survival ability of a certain population
[12]. There is evidence that moral behavior is the result of multi-level selection [13, 14],
but the exact mechanism is still not understood. Although the picture is not yet complete,
some of its parts are gradually becoming clearer. For instance, the essential role of intuitive
(emotional) judgments in the process of moral formation and decision making is now well
accepted and has been recently used in the formulation of the framework known as Moral
Foundations Theory (MFT) [15].
The essential role of emotions is, in fact, nothing but expected as motivation from emo-
tional satisfaction, independently of cultural differences, is a factor that has been identified
a long time ago as being decisive in the survival of an organism or a group even when their
physical needs are fulfilled [16].
In this work we use a simplified statistical mechanics model to study the influence of
different moral decisions in the overall emotional satisfaction of a human population. We
will not be interested in the problem of emergence of particular moral beliefs and, therefore,
we will assume that the concepts of what is morally acceptable is agreed a priori by the
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whole population. It is obvious that these concepts will vary and even exchange places in
different societies, but this will not affect our analysis.
The model analyzed here is infinite dimensional in the sense that each person from the
group interacts with every other person by taking a one-time binary decision: to act helpfully
or harmfully relative to the group’s agreed moral rules. The person’s decision is assumed to
be a conscious one, which is why we can actually call it a moral decision. We then classify
the moral decisions according to the level of empathy embodied in them.
Although MFT suggests that humans classify moral beliefs using at least five dimensions
instead of only one binary dimension (harmful/helpful), this simplification is enough for
the purposes of this work. A more sophisticated model can be obtained by considering the
agents as neural networks classifying moral multidimensional binary vectors as in [4].
The spectrum of moral decisions that can be taken by humans can be extremely compli-
cated and analyzing it would be out of the scope of this paper. Here we focus on what we
call n-th order moral decisions, where the order of the decision identifies the increasing level
of empathy necessary to take it according to the work of the well-known psychologist Jean
Piaget [17]. Piaget observed that there are distinct cognitive stages in the development of
the child intellect before it reaches the adult stage. This evolution occurs in three steps with
increasing levels of empathic capacity. It is this sequence of three steps that we call Piaget’s
Ladder and which defines the order of a moral decision.
Piaget has proposed, based on empirical observations, that every children first develops a
sense of self in which it is capable of understand its own feelings, but is unable to recognize
the feelings of others, acting only selfishly. Accordingly, we call this step the Selfish Step
and decisions taken selfishly are considered of 0th order. As its development proceeds, the
child becomes capable of recognizing that others also have feelings, but it is still unable to
see things from others’ perspective. We call it the Parental Step (1st order) as it is not
uncommon to parents to project their desires in the way the act towards their children.
Finally, the cognitive abilities of the child reach a stage in which it can finally understand
that others have different needs. This is the Empathic Step (2nd order). The details of
Piaget’s original theory of cognitive development have been several times revised to account
for further experimental evidence [18], but the details will not be as important for our
purposes, only its key idea of incremental empathy.
The agents of our network will act on one another using moral decisions which are com-
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binations of these three steps. These decisions, although conscious, are not rational in the
sense that agents do not devise strategies to maximize their well-being (to be defined rigor-
ously later) and simply follow a limited set of pre-determined rules. It is well known that
in a varied number of scenarios, this is usually the rule rather than the exception [19]. The
average well-being of the group defines then the phases of the statistical physics model and
we are then interested in characterizing how they change as the set of disorder parameters
of the model is varied.
A detailed explanation of how the model is constructed will be given in Sec. II together
with its analytical solution. The phase structure of this solution is obtained and analyzed
in Sec. III. Finally, we present our conclusions and further discussion in Sec. IV.
II. THE MODEL
We consider a population of N agents represented by the nodes of a fully connected social
network, as the one shown in fig.1 (left). Links between nodes indicate direct interactions
between agents. As the aim of this work is primarily to identify the emergence of collective
behavior in general, we solve only the fully connected case. The model can be straightfor-
wardly generalized to any topology, with an obvious increased difficulty for obtaining exact
solutions and we therefore will leave their analysis to forthcoming papers.
In the thermodynamic limit of N → ∞ (in which the fully connected case flows to the
mean-field solution) the model develops a very rich phase structure with different kinds
of non-thermal transitions. These transitions are induced by varying the intensity of the
disorder, understood to be the parameters of the different probability distributions of the
model which we will describe in the following.
Each static configuration of the network is defined by one single (frozen) realization of
three variables, namely J , u and v. The variable J is a matrix containing the moral decisions
taken by the agents towards others. A certain realization of J is obtained by each agent on a
generic site i acting on another agent at site j by taking a one-time binary decision: it either
acts harmfully or helpfully towards j, where these notions are judged according to a priori
moral concepts agreed by the entire network. Notice that neither choice is directly associated
to objective physical or psychological harm, but is based on the subjective acceptance of
this actions in the agent’s network (group, community, population, culture etc).
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FIG. 1. Fully connected social network (left) with non-symmetrical interactions between agents
(right).
The action of i on j is then represented by the matrix element Jij ∈ {0,±1}, where -1
indicates a harmful action and +1 a helpful one. The zero value corresponds to no action
at all. In the present model, we will restrict this value only to the diagonal entries of the
matrix J , i.e., those of the form Jii which represent self-interactions. The matrix J is not
symmetric in general as the order of indexes is important, the first representing the agent
that is originating the action and the second the one being targeted by it as depicted in fig.1
(right).
To each individual or node of the network, we associate a personality vector πi = (ui, wi)
with binary components ui, wi ∈ {±1}. These two components represent “emotional desires”
of the individual i. The first component, ui, indicates how the agent i would “desire”
to act towards another agent. When ui = −1, this indicates that agent i prefers to do
harmful actions, while a value +1 would indicate a preference for helpful ones. The assumed
emotional nature of these preferences is intended to mean that fulfilling them leads to a
subconscious satisfaction of the agent, which one can roughly associate to human feelings.
A sadistic personality, for instance, would be represented by ui = −1 as the agent feels
pleasure by harming others, while ui = +1 would represent an altruistic agent who enjoys
helping its peers.
The second component of the personality vector represents how the agent would like to be
treated by others. A wi = +1 is what one would expect from someone who would appreciate
the help of others, a behavior probably seen as “normal”, while wi = −1 corresponds to
an agent that prefers to be mistreated, as would be the case of a “masochist” agent, for
instance.
There are clearly several simplifications in the above personality attributions compared
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to real situations. First, we consider that both ui and wi depend only on the agent i. They
are the same independently of which agent is the target of the action. A more sophisticated
version of this model would consider that this preference might vary according to the target
and the agent’s feelings towards it. For instance, i might be emotionally led to act differently
whether it is interacting with its own mother or with a well-known serial killer.
Another simplification, which is less important for the situation we are going to study,
concerns the fact that the personality vector might change with time. Individual emotional
responses are not only genetically defined, but are affected by interaction with the environ-
ment. The scenario studied in this work does not deal with dynamics and, therefore, this
simplification is not relevant in the present case. It is however improbable that a signifi-
cant change in behavior that can affect the whole population occurs in a short time scale
(although it is not impossible to happen) and, therefore, we believe that we can consider
stable personalities for a certain macroscopic period of time as a first approximation.
The use of binary vectors to characterize the agents’ personalities represents also a strong
simplification. Human behavior has a wide spectrum of variability which would be better
modeled by continuous rather than binary variables. The intention of the present model,
however, is to take a first step towards this modeling and try to identify some general basic
principles and emergent behaviors. It is well-known that simplified models are used even
in social sciences and, in particular, in psychology, with the best known example being the
Myers-Brigg Type Indicator [20] which classifies human behavior by considering only 14
types and is largely used by institutions to actually select prospective employees.
Given the two personality components of πi, whether or not agent i feels fulfilled by the
interactions within its network will be represented by its satisfaction
σi = sgn[Ω(π, J, γ)], (1)
with
Ω(π, J, γ) =
1
N
[γUi + (1− γ)Wi], (2)
and
Ui = ui
∑
j 6=i
Jij , Wi = wi
∑
j 6=i
Jji. (3)
This definition allows three values for the agent’s satisfaction. When σi = +1, we say
that the agent feels satisfied, when σi = −1 it feels dissatisfied and when σi = 0 the agent
is neither.
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The scaling 1/N in Ω is used to make it an intensive quantity in the number of agents,
keeping it finite when N → ∞. This is the limit in which we are interested as it is only
when the number of agents is exactly infinite that we can unambiguously identify the model’s
phase transitions.
The extensive quantity Ui is the sum of all contributions to the fulfillment of the agent’s
desire on how to treat other agents, while the also extensive Wi represents the same concern-
ing how the agent feels treated by the others. The parameter γ is taken from the interval
[0, 1] for convenience and represents the relative emotional importance given by the individ-
ual to each of these terms. This parameter will be kept fixed and will be the same for the
whole network.
We recall that in the static version analyzed here, each realization of the whole experiment
will be considered as consisting of a fixed configuration of J and π which however varies from
one realization to another. Random disorder enters the model through the distributions of
possible values of these two variables in each realization of the “experiment” which might
involve a totally different set of individuals and interactions each time.
Notice that the satisfaction contains only “emotional” contributions. Human beings
have mechanisms to suppress emotional responses under rational considerations. Therefore,
a term based on each agent’s level of rationality can be devised which would compete with
its emotional satisfaction. However, such a consideration is out of the scope of the present
paper and should be addressed in more refined versions of the model.
For the present calculation, we assume that the personality parameters are i.i.d. with
distribution
P(u) = (1− s)δ(u, 1) + sδ(u,−1), (4)
P(w) = (1−m)δ(w, 1) +mδ(w,−1), (5)
and s,m ∈ [0, 1] (s and m the same for all agents).
A natural Hamiltonian for the whole network would be the negative of its net satisfaction
H = −∑i σi with the distribution of personalities being the quenched disorder and the
moral decisions Jij the dynamical variables (analogous to the spins in a magnetic model).
This would lead to a thermodynamic distribution for J at inverse temperature β given by
P(J |π) ∝ e−βH . Such an equilibrium distribution corresponds to a dynamics in which agents
are driven to act towards the minimization of the network’s energy, a behavior that can be
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Jij Order Moral Behavior
ui 0 Selfish
wi 1 Parental
wj 2 Empathetic
TABLE I. n-th order morals
classified as rational. As discussed in the Introduction, there are several reasons why agents
might not act rationally. For instance, they might lack either the will or the resources to
follow the strategy based on minimizing the energy. This is actually the case for our model
and, therefore, the distribution of decisions will not be the equilibrium one for this natural
choice of Hamiltonian.
In the particular case in which every agent has the same γ, the strategies that minimize
the Hamiltonian are very simple and easy to see. If γ > 1/2, then more importance is given
for Ui than for Wi and it benefits a totally selfish strategy. The opposite is true if γ < 1/2.
These two strategies, however might not be optimal in general outside these parameter
ranges. In fact, we will show that there are phase transitions in the average satisfaction
of the networking (to be defined in the following) when using these strategies outside their
optimality zone.
The specific distribution of the agent’s actions Jij we are going to use is, in fact, a
key feature of this work. In addition to the thermal equilibrium distribution and the two
simplified strategies considered above, there is clearly an infinite number of ways for an
agent to choose how to act towards another one. For instance, all agents could simply act in
the same way by choosing Jij = +1 independently of πi or πj . In order to be able to relate
our work to empirical facts, we focus on what we described in the introduction as n-th order
moral decisions based on Piaget’s Ladder, which result in the values for the matrix J given
in table I.
Here we consider the distribution of moral decisions defining the action of agent i towards
agent j to be given by a convex combination of the n-order moral decisions as
P(Jij|πi, πj) = p0δ(Jij , ui) + p1δ(Jij , wi) + p2δ(Jij, wj), (6)
with ∑
i
pi = 1, (7)
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FIG. 2. Graphical representation of moral strategies as points of a triangle.
which can be represented as points in an equilateral triangle as in fig. 2.
The probabilities in the above equation can be seen either as the proportion of individuals
choosing one of the three levels of moral decision or as the probability of one individual taking
each of them at a certain time. Because the 2nd order decision requires knowledge of the
personality vector of others, we will assume that agents possess full noiseless information
about the w component of all other agents. A more realistic scenario would be when only
partial information is available, adding an extra source of disorder.
The average satisfaction of the whole network can then be measured by averaging the
individual satisfactions over the decision strategy and over the disorder in the personality
vectors as
S = 〈σk〉u,w,J , (8)
in which the index k inside the average is only for convenience as it disappears due to the
averaging over all variables ui, wi and Jij represented by the vectors u and w and the matrix
J . This is equivalent to averaging over frozen realizations of the system.
We will take S as the order parameter defining the phases of the model. Ordered phases
correspond to situations where S = +1, with all agents but for a set of measure zero are
satisfied, and S = −1, when all agents are dissatisfied. Intermediate values of S correspond
to disordered phases. In the next section, we analyze the different behavior of the system
as the parameters of the model are varied.
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III. PHASE STRUCTURE
In the limit N →∞ of an infinitely sized network, one can obtain the exact value of the
average satisfaction for general values of the strategy’s probabilities as (see appendix A for
details)
S = 〈sgnµ〉u,w, (9)
where
µ = p0[γ + (1− γ)u¯w] + p1[γuw + (1− γ)w¯w] + p2[γw¯u+ (1− γ)], (10)
and
u¯ = 〈u〉 = (1− 2s), w¯ = 〈w〉 = (1− 2m). (11)
In the following, we will analyze the four special cases represented by the points in fig. 2.
A. 0th Order Moral
When p0 = 1 then p1 = p2 = 0 and we are assuming that all agents are acting selfishly,
or taking 0th order moral decisions. Agents act by ignoring other agents’ desires, maximally
satisfying their own Ui in every decision. The expression for the average satisfaction simplifies
to
S = (1−m) sgn[γ + (1− γ)(1− 2s)] +m sgn[γ − (1− γ)(1− 2s)]. (12)
This confirms the result we have discussed before that, when γ > 1/2, the system is in
the ordered phase S = +1 for all values of m and s as each agent’s satisfaction depends
more on how it acts on other agents than on how the others act on it.
The case γ = 1/2 is degenerate, giving
S = (1−m) sgn (1− s) +m sgn s. (13)
As s ∈ [0, 1], the above expression gives 1 for all values of m except for s = 0, 1, in which
case linear relations with m are obtained. Because these are simply one dimensional lines
on the borders of the diagram, they cannot be easily seen. This seems somewhat puzzling
as completely selfish moral decisions from every single person are guaranteeing the well-
being of the whole network even when both terms in the satisfaction have equal weights.
The balance between the two competing terms Ui and Wi for γ = 1/2 is however very
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delicate. The strategy p0 = 1 guarantees that everyone has always the maximum value for
its Ui, which means Ui/N → 1 in the thermodynamic limit. This implies that any small
deviation from complete dissatisfaction concerning the way agents are being treated will top
the balance to the side of a satisfied population.
The most interesting cases are when γ < 1/2, which means that more importance is
given to the way the agent is treated by others than to the way it treats other agents. Fig.
3 shows the result of the exact expressions and simulations for γ = 0.2. The simulations
are run with a population size of N = 1000 agents and averaged over 40 independently
generated realizations of J and π configurations. The diagram at the center is the result
of the simulation, the one at the left is the theoretical value for N = ∞. The difference
between the two diagrams is due to finite size effects.
The diagram to the right represents the leading order theoretical correction for the sys-
tem’s finite size. Because σ2 in equation (A21) from appendix A is identically zero when
p0 = 0, we need to consider the variance coming from the average over the ui’s. This leads
to the expression
S(N) = (1−m) erf
[
γ + (1− γ)(1− 2s)√
2[1− (1− 2s)2]/N
]
+m erf
[
γ − (1− γ)(1− 2s)√
2[1− (1− 2s)2]/N
]
. (14)
One can see that a rich phase structure in the diagram develops with the appearance of
three very distinctive bands. The central band represents the ordered phase S = 1 and its
width decreases with γ. This width can be calculated in the following way. Let us assume
that γ = 1/2 − ǫ where 0 < ǫ ≤ 1/2. The ordered band requires the arguments of the two
sign functions to be positive independently of the value of m, i.e.
γ + (1− γ)(1− 2s) > 0, γ − (1− γ)(1− 2s) > 0. (15)
This implies
2ǫ
1 + 2ǫ
< s <
1
1 + 2ǫ
, (16)
and the bandwidth is therefore
δ =
1− 2ǫ
1 + 2ǫ
. (17)
Notice that the area in which the whole network is fully satisfied with the distribution
of moral decisions is larger than or at most equal to that in which it is not. This holds for
any value of γ due to the symmetry of the lateral bands. This is a disheartening result as
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FIG. 3. Phase diagrams of selfish decisions for γ = 0.2 (color online). Left: exact result for
the infinite system; middle: computer simulation with N = 1000 averaged over 40 independently
generated configurations; right: leading order analytical approximation for N = 1000. The central
band (online red) is totally ordered while the order parameter varies linearly from -1 to 1 in the
lateral bands from top to bottom in the left band and from bottom to top in the right band.
it suggests that trying to derive moral decisions from rational principles that benefit society
as a whole in an objective way might not be attainable. Such a principle would force one to
accept that completely selfish decisions are morally correct, even when they are meant to do
harm to those who do not want it. Of course this result is based on a simplified model, but
it clearly illustrates that tying moral concepts to some rational measure of social well-being
does not work in general.
The diagram is also interesting from the statistical physics point of view. By keeping m
constant and varying s from zero to one, we pass through two discontinuous phase transi-
tions. We start with a disordered phase which becomes ordered at the central band and
then becomes disordered once again, but with an average satisfaction with the opposite sign.
These transitions are shown in fig. 4. Inside each of the two disordered bands, by keeping
s fixed and varying m in the interval [0, 1], we have a continuous linear crossover between
the two ordered phases with opposite signs of satisfaction.
Another interesting phase diagram is obtained by plotting the values of S in a γ × s
diagram, what is shown if fig. 5 for the fixed value m = 0.8. One can clearly see the quick
growth of the central ordered band as the parameter γ increases from zero to 1/2.
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FIG. 4. The graph shows the order parameter S along a line of constant m = 0.3 in the phase
diagrams of fig. 3 (color online). The dots (online blue) represent the values of the simulations,
the smooth line closer to them (online green) is the leading order finite size approximation and the
non-smooth distribution (online red) is the infinite system. Notice that in this case γ = 0.2, giving
a width of 0.25 for the ordered central band with edges at s = 0.375 and s = 0.625.
FIG. 5. Phase diagram (color online) showing the discotinuous transitions when γ and s are varied
for constant m = 0.8. The left graph shows the result for an infinite system, while the right one
shows the simulated diagram for N = 1000.
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FIG. 6. Continuous phase transition from a disordered to an ordered phase at γ = 1/2 with the
order parameter taken as the average over the disorder in the personality vectors of the network
satisfaction (S¯) for 0th order moral decisions.
Fig. 6 shows the continuous phase transition resulting from the change in the ordered
band width at γ = 1/2 by taking as the order parameter S¯, the average of S over the disorder
parameters s and m.
B. 2nd Order Moral
From the moral point of view, one would be more inclined to accept that 2nd order
moral decisions are better, or more considerate, choices than 0th order ones. The former is
based on the idea of respecting others, while the latter bears no consideration for other’s
feelings. By construction, the model we are using has a symmetry connecting these two
moral strategies. The substitution
γ → 1− γ, ui → wi, Jij → Jji, (18)
keeps all σi the same and, therefore, also the average satisfaction S. The effect on S is
equivalent if we change the last substitution by
p0 = 1→ p2 = 1. (19)
Therefore, if we change from selfish to empathetic moral decisions, the diagrams exchange
their vertical and horizontal axes at the same time as γ → 1− γ. As in the selfish case, the
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area of the diagram in which the satisfaction is positive is always larger than the negative
one for all values of γ. If it was not for the fact that the same happens with the selfish
behavior, that would be good news.
Although our model is quite simple, it is based on reasonable enough assumptions. Given
the agreed concepts of morality, one can then see that two completely opposite moral deci-
sions taken by the whole population guarantee the well-being of the network in the majority
of the parameter space. This implies that, if one bases the concept of morality on “rational”
arguments concerning the overall well-being, both behaviors should be considered morally
right. None is more harmful to the society than the other.
This result seems paradoxical, but it arises from associating moral to satisfying the major-
ity. Satisfying the majority is many times equivalent to ignoring or oppressing the minority,
which is morally not acceptable. The paradox disappears if one recognizes that what can be
associated with the definition of morally acceptable behavior is in fact the value of γ. We
tend to consider behaviors to be morally acceptable when everyone is being respected by
others, which is equivalent to count only the term Wi for the satisfaction. In other words,
this is the situation when γ = 0. For the selfish strategy, a trivial calculation shoes that this
results in S¯ = 0 while for the empathic strategy this gives S¯ = 1, the expected result for a
morally accepted behavior.
There are many repressive moral beliefs in all societies which vary with time and that
are not agreed by all individuals. For instance, the well-known repression of homosexual
individuals in World War II in Britain, which was the probable cause of Alan Turin’s suicide,
was considered a correct moral behavior at that time. In India and many other parts of the
world, arranged marriages are still in practice even though the bride might not have a say in
the final decision. Several religions have strict dressing codes and enforcing it, even violently
in some cases, are considered as moral behavior even when it goes against the wishes of the
individuals. However, these behaviors would all fall in the S¯ = 0 region for γ = 0, which is
a culturally independent criteria.
C. 1st Order Moral
There is no symmetry connecting 0th and 2nd order moral decisions to 1st order ones.
Taking only 1st order moral decisions creates a different phase diagram. The argument of
15
FIG. 7. Phase diagrams for the 1st order moral decisions (color online). Left: s×m phase diagram
for γ = 0.2 showing the discontinuous transitions on the borders of the central band. Right: m×γ
diagram for s = 0.8. One can see the continuous transition in which the central band disappears
completely at the value γ = 1/2.
the sign function simplifies to
µ = γuw + (1− γ)(1− 2m)w, (20)
and the average satisfaction is then
S = (1− 2m){(1− s) sgn[γ + (1− γ)(1− 2m)] + s sgn[−γ + (1− γ)(1− 2m)]}. (21)
Analogous phase diagrams to the ones for the other strategies are given in fig. 7 which
shows a very similar structure, but with different details of the phases and transitions. For
instance, the s × m diagram still presents a central band, which is however not totally
ordered. It is also of opposite sign compared to the 0th and 2nd order strategies, with the
central band indicating a disordered phase with negative satisfaction. The limits and size of
the band are however the same as for the other strategies, which also implies the presence
of a continuous phase transition in S¯ when γ is varied. This transition, depicted in fig. 8, is
however between a partially ordered and a totally disordered phase, differently from those
for the other strategies.
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FIG. 8. Continuous phase transition from a partially ordered (S¯ = 1/2) to a disordered phase at
γ = 1/2.
This also shows that when γ = 0 we have S¯ = 1/2. If we use the criteria suggested
before, this is still a behavior which should not be considered morally acceptable, but would
be more acceptable than the completely selfish decisions.
D. Mixed Strategy
For the sake of completeness, we will briefly consider a mixed strategy for which p0 =
p1 = p2 = 1/3. This strategy is unlikely to appear in real life as it has no well-defined
rational behind it. Fig. 9 shows a comparison between the n-order moral decisions and
the mixed strategy. All strategies present continuous phase transitions in S¯ for γ = 1/2
as is evident from the discontinuities in the derivatives at that point. Although the mixed
strategy remains as the second best throughout all range of γ, it only attains S¯ = 1 at the
critical point.
As discussed before, it seems reasonable to associate some sort of degree of morality to
each strategy by their values at γ = 0. It is then interesting to note that by randomly
choosing each strategy with the same probability each time leads to a much higher moral
degree than the 0th and 1st order strategies. One might be tempted to argue that some
respect once in a while is much better than none. This striking difference can be better
understood by looking at the phase diagrams s ×m for all strategies at γ = 0 given in fig.
17
FIG. 9. Continuous phase transitions on S¯ = 1/2 for the four strategies at γ = 1/2.
10.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In this work we analyzed a model of agents interacting in a fully connected network
by taking moral decisions. The agent’s decisions were constrained by an increased level
of empathy based on the stages of Piaget’s theory of cognitive development. Within this
model, we defined a measure of emotional satisfaction related to the fulfillment of the agents’
personal desires to characterize the phases of the network as the parameters of the model are
varied. These desires were modeled by local random binary fields at each site of the network
and were called personality vectors as they represent personality traits of the agents.
The introduced model is exactly solvable. We were able to calculate analytically the
value of the average satisfaction of the network in the limit of an infinite number of agents
and also its leading order contribution in powers of 1/N . Using the average satisfaction as
an order parameter, we then were able to find the model’s phase diagrams and to identify
the existence of both continuous and discontinuous transitions triggered by the variation of
the disorder parameters.
We chose to analyze four different specific strategies of moral decisions in this work. In
the first three, agents take decisions according to each stage in Piaget’s theory, a three-
steps hierarchy to which we gave the name of Piaget’s Ladder. Each step in this ladder
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FIG. 10. Phase diagrams for the four strategies at γ = 0 (color online). From left to right. Top
row: 0th order, 1st order. Bottom row: 2nd order, mixed.
is associated with an n-th order moral. The 0th order corresponds to completely selfish
decisions and the 2nd order to completely empathetic ones. The 1st order corresponds to an
intermediate case. In addition to these three strategies, we also analyzed the case in which
each agent takes a decision by randomly choosing one of those strategies at each time.
Interestingly, there is a symmetry between the 0th and 2nd order moral decisions resulting
int he fact that the selfish strategy guarantees the average well-being of the network as well
as the empathetic one. Although the model is very simple, its assumptions are reasonable
enough to indicate that moral beliefs cannot be simply based on rational minimization of
some energy function as two strategies that would clearly be considered morally opposite
by most people lead to the same phase diagrams. One possibility is that the parameters
of the disorder are tuned in humans to values for which a species-wide agreement on moral
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concepts can be derived. One solution to this conundrum suggested by us was that a moral
degree might be associated not to the overall satisfaction, but to its particular case in which
the satisfaction of others is more important than ours. This leads to a sensible classification
when all four strategies are compared. Of course, a more realistic view, as that of MFT,
would require a more sophisticated set of parameters, but this is out of the scope of the
present analysis.
The 0th and 2nd order strategies minimize the Hamiltonian in the appropriate domains
of the parameter γ which measures the relative importance of the two terms in the satisfac-
tion. As expected, the 1st order and the mixed strategies underperform those strategies in
their optimal ranges, although the mixed strategy seems to be the one which remains more
acceptable in a wider range of γ.
From the technical point of view, the present model has many interesting properties. It
is simple enough to be easily interpretable and completely solvable. At the same time, it
presents a range of very interesting phase diagrams and transitions. We have discussed only
some basic features of these transitions due to size constraints of this paper, choosing to
focus on the interpretation of these results. In a forthcoming paper, we intend to explore
the interesting mathematical structure of this model in more detail.
Finally, there are many directions in which this model can be extended in order to include
more realistic behavior. For instance, different network topologies can be used. One could
also devise a scenario in which agents try to infer by a learning algorithm the desires of others.
This would bring dynamics into the model and require a more sophisticated treatment which
we will leave for a future study. The personality vector also can be extended either to a
higher dimensionality to include more realistic personality variations or to continuous instead
of binary values. We intend to explore these extensions in future works.
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Appendix A: Analytical Calculation of the Average Satisfaction
We can explicitly write the expression for the average satisfaction S as
S = 〈σk〉u,w,J =
∑
{ui}
∑
{wi}
∑
{Jij}
[∏
i
P(ui)P(wi)
]∏
i,j
i 6=j
P(Jij |ui, wi, uj, wj)


× sgn
[
1
N
(
γuk
∑
l 6=k
Jkl + (1− γ)wk
∑
l 6=k
Jlk
)]
.
(A1)
We start by doing the average over J . The argument of the sign contains averages
over N variables Jij . Although they are not identically distributed, the fact that they are
independent given u and w allows us to use an extension of the Central Limit Theorem
(CLT). In the following, we explicitly present this extension.
By means of a Dirac delta distribution, one can write the above equation as
S =
〈∫
dx dxˆ
2π
eixxˆ(sgn x)Γ(xˆ,u,w, γ)
〉
u,w
, (A2)
with
Γ =
∑
{Jij}

∏
i,j
i 6=j
P(Jij|ui, wi, uj, wj)

 exp
{
−ixˆ
N
[
γuk
∑
l 6=k
Jkl + (1− γ)wk
∑
l 6=k
Jlk
]}
. (A3)
The average can now be factorized and written as
∏
l 6=k
Λ1lkΛ
2
lk = exp
{∑
l 6=k
(
ln Λ1lk + lnΛ
2
lk
)}
, (A4)
where
Λ1lk ≡
∑
Jkl
P(Jkl) exp
{
−ixˆ
N
γukJkl
}
, (A5)
Λ2lk ≡
∑
Jlk
P(Jlk) exp
{
−ixˆ
N
(1− γ)wkJlk
}
, (A6)
with k a fixed index.
Given that J is a binary matrix, we can rewrite the probability distributions as
P(Jij |πi, πj) = p0
(
1 + Jijui
2
)
+ p1
(
1 + Jijwi
2
)
+ p2
(
1 + Jijwj
2
)
, (A7)
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which gives
Λ1lk = cos
[
γxˆ
N
]
− i(p0 + ukwkp1 + ukwlp2) sin
[
γxˆ
N
]
(A8)
Λ2lk = cos
[
(1− γ)xˆ
N
]
− i(ulwkp0 + wlwkp1 + p2) sin
[
(1− γ)xˆ
N
]
. (A9)
Expanding the cosines, sines and logarithms up to order 1/N2, we get
ln Λ1lk ≈ −
γ2xˆ2
2N2
[
1− (λ1kl)2]− iγxˆN λ1kl, (A10)
ln Λ2lk ≈ −
(1− γ)2xˆ2
2N2
[
1− (λ2kl)2]− i(1− γ)xˆN λ2kl, (A11)
where
λ1kl = p0 + ukwkp1 + ukwlp2, (A12)
λ2kl = ulwkp0 + wlwkp1 + p2. (A13)
By defining
µ ≡ 1
N
∑
l 6=k
[
γλ1kl + (1− γ)λ2kl
]
, (A14)
σ2 ≡ 1
N2
∑
l 6=k
{
γ2
[
1− (λ1kl)2]+ (1− γ)2[1− (λ2kl)2]}, (A15)
we can write
S =
〈∫
dx dxˆ
2π
e−
xˆ2σ2
2
+ixˆ(x−µ)(sgn x)
〉
u,w
=
〈
erf
(
µ√
2σ2
)〉
u,w
.
(A16)
Notice that this is the extension of the CLT that we alluded to. The average over J
became an average over a Gaussian distributed variable x with mean µ and variance σ2
which are what we would obtain by calculating the mean and variance of each Jij and doing
the appropriate linear combination or, using the notation of equation (2),
µ =
1
N
∑
l 6=k
[γuk〈Jkl〉 + (1− γ)wk〈Jlk〉], (A17)
σ2 =
1
N2
∑
l 6=k
[
γ2(1− 〈Jkl〉2) + (1− γ)2(1− 〈Jlk〉2)
]
, (A18)
where
〈Jij〉 = p0ui + p1wi + p2wj. (A19)
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The expressions for µ and σ2 can be further simplified for N →∞
µ =
1
N
∑
l 6=k
[γ(p0 + ukwkp1 + ukwlp2) + (1− γ)(ulwkp0 + wlwkp1 + p2)]
= p0[γ + (1− γ)u¯wk] + p1[γukwk + (1− γ)w¯wk] + p2[γw¯uk + (1− γ)],
(A20)
and
σ2 =
1
N2
∑
l 6=k
{
γ2
[
1− (p0 + ukwkp1 + ukwlp2)2
]
+ (1− γ)2[1− (ulwkp0 + wlwkp1 + p2)2]}
=
1
N
{[
γ2 + (1− γ)2](1− p20 − p21 − p22)− 2p0p1[γ2ukwk + (1− γ)2C¯]
−2p0p2
[
γ2ukw¯ + (1− γ)2u¯wk
]− 2p1p2[γ2 + (1− γ)2]wkw¯} .
(A21)
where we introduced the definitions
u¯ =
1
N
∑
l 6=k
ul, w¯ =
1
N
∑
l 6=k
wl, C¯ =
1
N
∑
l 6=k
ulwl. (A22)
The CLT can now be directly applied in its original form to the above variables, resulting
in
S =
〈
erf
(
µ√
2σ2
)〉
uk,wk,u¯,w¯,C¯
, (A23)
where the hatted variables are distributed according to the following Gaussian distributions
u¯ ∼ N (u¯|〈ui〉, σ2u), (A24)
w¯ ∼ N (w¯|〈wi〉, σ2w), (A25)
C¯ ∼ N
(
u¯|〈ui〉〈wi〉,σ2uw
)
, (A26)
where
N (y|µy, σ2y) ≡ e
−
(y−µy)
2
2σ2y√
2πσ2y
, (A27)
and
〈ui〉 = (1− 2s), σ2u = 1− 〈ui〉2 = 4s(1− s), (A28)
〈wi〉 = (1− 2m), σ2w = 1− 〈wi〉2 = 4m(1−m), (A29)
σ2uiwi = 1− 〈ui〉2〈wi〉2. (A30)
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We do not need to carry the index k anymore and therefore we write u and w instead of
uk and wk. In the limit N → ∞, the above Gaussians become Dirac deltas in their means
and the error function becomes the sign of its argument, which gives our final expression
S = 〈sgnµ〉u,w, (A31)
with
µ = p0[γ + (1− γ)(1− 2s)w] + p1[γuw + (1− γ)(1− 2m)w] + p2[γ(1− 2m)u+ (1− γ)].
(A32)
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